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INTRODUCTION
The study of people’s behaviors during different economic climates
is now a serious field of study—just look at newly minted Nobel Prize
winner Richard H. Thaler’s research in behavioral economics.1 The U.S.
economy will likely produce ample research material for Mr. Thaler in the
coming years because of its 3% increase in gross domestic product and its
0.4% increase in personal income—numbers that are just a snapshot of the
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1. Richard H. Thaler: Interview, THE NOBEL PRIZE (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2017/thaler/interview/ [https://perma.cc/3TQB-NK6E].
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2017 third quarter.2 With these promising numbers, Americans are able to
change their relationships with money: “now that we’re seeing some
income growth, broad based across the economy, people are moving the
needle on savings in a way we haven’t seen in a while.”3 Now that the time
for saving is here, the focus shifts to finding a successful method to do so.
A novel approach has emerged in seventeen states: domestic asset
protection trusts (DAPTs).4
DAPTs are self-settled spendthrift trusts that allow the settlor to
retain a beneficial interest in the trust while removing it from the reach of
future creditors.5 These trusts are irrevocable with an “independent trustee
who has absolute discretion to make distributions to a class of beneficiaries
which includes the settlor. The primary goals of DAPTs are asset
protection and, if so designed, transfer tax minimization.”6
The history of authorizing DAPTs spans decades and has slowly
crept from the west coast to the east coast. After two states seemed to
support DAPTs in statutory terms, Alaska enacted the first operational
statute in 1997.7 During the two proceeding decades, nineteen states have
authorized some form of revised statute or act supporting DAPTs.8 A
settlor now has the option of settling funds in one of seventeen domestic
jurisdictions or choosing to put money in one of the many offshore
jurisdictions available.9
By instinct, the choice seems easy—why not keep your money down
the street instead of transferring it to the Cayman Islands?10 A local bank
does not pose the same apparent risks as transferring your money outside
of the country.11 The decision is not as simple as it should be because of
2. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., https://www.bea.gov/ [https://perma
.cc/FL2K-AEVV].
3. Anna Bahney, Americans are Saving (a Little) More, CNN: MONEY (June 20, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/20/pf/emergency-fund/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XUJ-2CC4].
4. David G. Shaftel et al., Eleventh Annual ACTEC Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection
Trust Statutes, ACTEC (Aug. 2017), http://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Shaftel-Comparison-of-theDomestic-Asset-Protection-Trust-Statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5A3-GTAN].
5. Wesley D. Cain, Note, Judgment Proof: Can Connecticut Residents Insulate Assets from
Creditors Using a Delaware Domestic Asset Protection Trust?, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (2015).
6. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
7. Id.
8. See id. DAPT friendly states include: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
9. See Matthew Russo, Comment, Asset Protection: An Analysis of Domestic and Offshore Trust
Accounts, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 265, 279–91 (2014).
10. See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 515 (2000) (stating the palpable advantages of avoiding foreign
jurisdiction due to different languages, political and legal structure, and currency).
11. See Paul M. Roder, Note, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move
“Offshore” Trusts onto the Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999).
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each state court’s uncertainty surrounding the novel trusts.12 Counsel is
less likely to suggest a strategy that has not been reviewed by a court, as
counsel would be unable to ensure its effectiveness for their client.
It took fifteen years for a court to contemplate the efficacy of
DAPTs.13 The Washington bankruptcy case, In re Huber, involved a
Washington settlor who created a self-settled trust under Alaska law.14 The
case was decided on a choice of law question, with the trial court
concluding that Washington law, not Alaska law, governed when deciding
the validity of the Alaskan trust.15 By applying Washington law, the court
pronounced that the trust violated Washington’s public policy against selfsettled trusts, thereby rendering the trust void.16
Nonetheless, the tides in favor of DAPTs have taken a turn with the
holding of Klabacka v. Nelson. Correspondingly, through the lens of this
favorable ruling, this Note will address why DAPTs should be regarded as
an effective method of protecting a settlor’s money and argue for more
states to follow suit. More specifically, this Note will describe why the
Klabacka case came to the correct holding because of public policy
sentiment and economic jurisdictional competition.
First, this Note illustrates that the Klabacka case mercifully
establishes a clear test for the efficacy of DAPTs. Notably, this is the first
case to reach the efficacy question and provides an attractive template for
succeeding states. Second, this Note demonstrates that the Klabacka case
was decided correctly because current public policy favors the use of
DAPTs.17 There are already similar, legitimate techniques available to
protect assets that are not against public policy, so it follows that public
policy favors DAPTs. For instance, homestead exemptions18 and tenancy
12. Generally, domestic asset protection trusts offered less shelter in comparison to offshore
trusts. See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
287, 309–10 (2002) (comparing common characteristics of offshore trusts and contemporary trust law
and determining that a multitude of problems exist in domestic asset protection trusts as opposed to
their offshore counterparts).
13. DAPTs were first introduced in 1997 via Alaska statute, yet the first court case appeared
fifteen years later in Washington. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1; Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber),
493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013).
14. Waldron, 493 B.R. at 807–09.
15. Id. at 808–09. In general, choice of law doctrine determines which laws apply to any given
case. When the case has some connection to multiple jurisdictions, a court can either apply the law of
the forum state or the law of the location of transaction giving rise to the litigation. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
16. Waldron, 493 B.R. at 809. An illegal trust is one that is contrary to a statute, public policy,
or morality. Illegal Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
17. See discussion infra Section III.
18. A homestead exemption shelters a certain amount of a home’s worth from property taxes.
See Property Tax Homestead Exemptions, INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY (2011),
https://itep.org/property-tax-homestead-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/3WMU-2868].
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by the entirety19 currently permit individuals to legally protect their assets
from creditors.20 In essence, DAPTs have an unfair negative stigma when
considering the other asset protection vehicles seemingly in-line with
public policy.
Furthermore, Klabacka’s favorable holding of these principles may
summon transformation on a macro scale, including an advantageous
impact on interstate federalism.21 Particularly, this Note emphasizes that
encouraging settlors to create DAPTs celebrates the fiscal advantages of
interstate federalism—especially the economic significance of interstate
competition.
Through the above-mentioned grounds, this Note will champion the
holding in Klabacka, exclaiming it should be the standard for deciding the
efficacy of future DAPTs. Thus, Part I briefly outlines the development of
trust law, from the beginning of trusts to the emergence of domestic asset
protection laws. Part II summarizes the facts, reasoning, and holding of
Klabacka v. Nelson. Part III analyzes Klabacka in relation to domestic
asset protection trusts generally, stressing the lack of direction in this field,
the clear need for certainty, and the benefit of establishing a test. Part IV
contends that courts should appreciate the benefits of these trusts not only
for the settlor and beneficiary, but also for states and the country. A short
conclusion will follow.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Basics of Trust Law
To understand the public policy fueling DAPTs and the Klabacka
holding, it is important to understand trust law at large in the United States.
The most basic description of a trust is an explanation detailing a threeparty fiduciary affiliation relating to property; the first party transfers the
legal title upon the second party for the benefit of the third party.22 Often
the second party, the trustee, manages the property with full independence,

19. Tenancy by entirety only involves jurisdictions allowing the protection of property from the
creditors of one spouse. See Tenancy by the Entirety, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST. (Apr. 21,
2018, 9:47 PM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tenancy_by_the_entirety [https://perma.cc/GU68ZQXU].
20. See John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset
Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2621, 2668 (2006).
21. See generally Alexander B. Shiffman, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust and Its
Federalism Implications, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 853 (2015).
22. See Trust, BUS. DICTIONARY (Apr. 21, 2018, 2:27 PM), http://www.businessdictionary.
com/definition/trust.html [https://perma.cc/2RNM-KSN4].
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while the third party, the beneficiary, is permitted to receive payments
from the trust income or corpus.23
American law deals with the attempt to manipulate conduct after
death, commonly referred to as “dead hand” control, differently than its
English predecessor.24 American trust law placed a higher level of
deference to the testator, allowing for more control after death than its
English counterpart.25 A primary example of this control is the spendthrift
trust.26 A spendthrift is used for the purposes of shielding the trust body
while granting the beneficiary trust income distributions.27 Settlors
favored the idea of giving a gift in installments (versus a lump sum to be
squandered immediately) but sought to protect the gift from the
beneficiary’s creditors.28 The spendthrift offers the supreme protection of
wealth: protection from a frivolous beneficiary and shelter from the
beneficiary’s powerful creditors.29
In its simplest explanation, a spendthrift trust is a trust that
incorporates specific clauses that bar the beneficiary from freely
dissipating their interest but also prevent attachment by creditors.30 A
creditor may attach to the assets when a trust distribution has occurred but
cannot take out a lien on the trust or pierce the trust veil.31
The general acceptance of spendthrift trusts in the United States owes
a debt to two cases in the 1800s.32 Over time, the vast majority of the state
governing bodies and courts have recognized the efficacy of spendthrift

23. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 70, 385 (9th
ed. 2013).
24. Because of public policy, dead hand control is limited, specifically by the rule against
perpetuities. See Deadhand Control, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST. (Apr. 21, 2018, 8:10 PM),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/deadhand_control [https://perma.cc/SKL2-RRJW].
25. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning
of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum
extent allowed by law.”).
26. N. Camille Varner, Is The Dead Hand Losing Its Grip in Texas?: Spendthrift Trusts and In
Re Townley Bypass Unified Credit Trust, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 598, 599 (2010).
27. Id. at 69498.
28. GERRY W. BEYER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 376 (6th
ed. 2015).
29. Id.
30. Lischer, supra note 10, at 485. One such attachment by creditors that is authorized occurs
when there have been fraudulent transfers or if the creditor is part of a special class that the beneficiary
is legally bound to support. Russo, supra note 9, at 282, 277.
31. Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Comment, Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust, 15
WYO. L. REV. 551, 555 (2015).
32. See generally Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875); Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133
Mass. 170 (1882).
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provisions.33 The policies supporting the validity of spendthrift provisions
are that the settlor has the right to dispose of property as they please; the
public will not be burdened by insolvent beneficiaries; and creditors have
the duty to investigate the settlor’s finances and should know well enough
to not use the trust when calculating credit lines.34 In this day and age,
spendthrift provisions are accepted in all fifty states.35 As time wears on,
the edges of these laws are slowly carved out through deliberation on
specific issues.36 I consider one of the most provocative of these issues
arises from a self-settled spendthrift trust.
B. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts’ History
As explained above, most jurisdictions accept the idea of a
spendthrift provision. However, spendthrift trusts created by the settlor
and for the settlor’s benefit are not as widely accepted.37 Some
jurisdictions find that if a fraction of beneficial interest is held for the
settlor of the trust, the instrument is considered void.38 The policy
consideration for this rule is a concern that property owners could shelter
their money for their own needs without being required to pay back or
mislead creditors.39 Courts recognized well-intending property owners
hoping to provide for a beneficiary with creditor protection, while at the
same time acknowledged the likelihood of property owners wishing to
“protect themselves against their own profligacy, at the expense of their
creditors.”40 Creditors rely on the debtor’s apparent income and could be
misled into believing the debtor is financially stable based on the trust,
only to find out the settlor has no other assets outside of the shelter of the
trust.41 In contrast, the argument has been made that a

33. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(B) (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:9–11
(West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010–180 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18–B § 105(2)(E)
(2016); ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2015).
34. BEYER, supra note 28, at 377.
35. See HALENE S. SHAPO, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222, at 420 (3rd ed. 2007) (compiling numerous spendthrift provisions
in all fifty states, along with their exceptions).
36. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 23, at 697 (“The policy debate in contemporary
times has shifted to the question of whether to make exceptions for certain classes of creditors, such
as spouses and children or tort victims.”). These exceptions are the main focus of the holdings in
Klabacka v. Nelson and Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall v. Wacker, to be discussed later.
37. Cain, supra note 5, at 1470.
38. Id.
39. See Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the
Settlor, 44 HARV. L. REV. 203, 203–04 n.1 (1930).
40. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1035, 1044 (2000).
41. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 155–56 (6th ed. 1987).
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creditor that was going to lend money to somebody, usually took a
look at what they owned. When they looked at somebody who may
have a self-settled or had spendthrift trust, they know as a creditor
they would not be able to touch those assets so they did not lend,
based on those assets.42

However, self-paternalism was considered to be more beneficial than
the costs of allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts.43 The only option for
settlors seeking asset protection to the highest extent was to gamble by
creating a spendthrift trust with the beneficiary as someone other than the
settlor.44 That is, until the 1980s rolled around and numerous offshore
jurisdictions began attracting trust business with an inventive technique:
the self-settled asset protection trust.45 These foreign jurisdictions enacted
legislation that determined that judgments rendered by overseas courts
were non-enforceable against the suite of trust parties: settlors,
beneficiaries, and self-settled trusts.46 Some estimates indicate that more
than one trillion dollars sit in offshore jurisdictions under asset protection
trusts.47
C. Emergence of Domestic Asset Protection Trusts
In 1997, Alaska was the first state to introduce a self-settled asset
protection statute.48 This law condoned the formation of irrevocable trusts
that made distributions to a class of beneficiaries allowing allocations to
the settlor.49 Delaware followed suit later that same year, stating that it
“intended to maintain [its] role as the most favored domestic jurisdiction

42. See Hearing on A.B. 469 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 7 (1999)
(statement of David Goldwater, Assem. Dist. 10, Southern Nev.), https://www.leg.state.nv.us
/Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1999/AB469,1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/56TF-KN9X].
43. See, e.g., Ariz. Bank v. Morris, 436 P.2d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (declaring that fairness
counterpoised the possible benefits for the settlor); Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 424 (9th Cir.
1991) (“The image of a wise and benevolent person seeking to provide for a foolish and impulsive
loved one supersedes the values which generally require that creditors be able to have access to
debtors’ assets and allows for spendthrift trusts. However, this image of benevolent paternalism is
absent when the settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary.”) (citations omitted).
44. See Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes—Glossary of Trust Terms, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/abusive-trust-tax-evasion-schemesglossary-of-trust-terms [https://perma.cc/K9S8-WJG2] (defining “strawman” as the person whose
trust receives another grantor’s assets to be passed through the original trust to a second or more trusts
for the purpose of disguising the true identity or ownership of the assets).
45. See Sterk, supra note 40, at 1047–48.
46. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 23, at 704–05.
47. Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: “The Estate Planning Tool of the
Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998).
48. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
49. See Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110 (1997).
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of the establishment of trusts.”50 In recent years, fifteen states have
followed Alaska and Delaware, allowing for self-settled asset protection
trusts.51 Each state legislature has approached the issue differently,
especially regarding exceptions for potentially fraudulent actions, burden
of proof, and asset protection.52
While these statutes have now been in existence for over twenty
years, there are few cases litigating the nuances of the trusts they create.53
An explanation for such a dearth of litigation is that there have not been
any creditors or plaintiffs needing to challenge the efficacy of a self-settled
asset protection trust—though this is quite unlikely. More likely, a settlor
ends up paying the money owed or settles outside of court to avoid costly
litigation. Because courts have not addressed the public policy questions,
the edges of these laws are still obscured—it is plausible that courts would
prefer that this inquiry took place on the legislative floor. Inquiries on
legislative floors across the country would in turn address the primary
issues facing these trusts.
D. The Surety and Surplus Issue
There are two main issues facing domestic asset protection trusts
today: (1) enforceability and (2) the fact that only a minority of states have
enacted them. As demonstrated through the various cases mentioned
above, many courts are unwilling to find a DAPT enforceable. Courts have
demonstrated a stringent adherence to presumed public policy and a
preference to apply local laws (even in the face of explicit contrary
language). One Utah court even held that the trust instrument was
revocable, and thus could be attached by creditors.54
The uncertainty posed by DAPTs is presented twofold: first, for
attorneys who are unsure whether to advise clients to potentially use
DAPTs and second, for settlors who are again gambling with assets
reminiscent of the initial days of moving accounts offshore. Attorneys who
wish to venture into DAPT use should study the current cases on record,
always being diligent to note if there are new developments in the laws.55
An attorney must be aware of how the courts are interpreting a particular
state’s DAPT law, whether it is the participating state establishing
50. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 713 (10th ed.
2017) (citing Synopsis of Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, H.B. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 Del.
Laws 452 (1997)).
51. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
52. See generally id.
53. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
54. See, e.g., Dahl v. Dahl, 345 P.3d 566, 579–81 (Utah 2015) (holding that the instrument was
a revocable trust, instead of a domestic asset protection trust, based on language in the document).
55. See Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
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precedent or supportive theory for advancing a current law. As always, the
final advice for attorneys is to avoid implementation errors, ensuring that
the case is decided on its merits and not scriveners’ error. Yet, all this
advice does not remedy the actual problem: attorneys lack certainty
regarding how a court will rule on any given DAPT case. This insecurity
surely stagnates the use of a potentially massively beneficial legal tool for
Americans.
The surety question surrounding DAPTs was recently clarified to an
extent with the holding in the Alaska Supreme Court case Toni 1 Trust, by
Tangwall v. Wacker.56 The court held it could not limit the scope of
another court’s jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer action against a
DAPT.57 Specifically, the court held that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not compel states to follow another state’s statute claiming exclusive
jurisdiction over suits based on a cause of action ‘even though [the other
state] created the right of action.’”58
The trust in question was established in Alaska, a DAPT-friendly
state, but held Montana property, where DAPTs are not accepted.59 With
this holding there is hardly a theory about how a DAPT would protect
assets against the creditors of the settlor in non-DAPT states. The court’s
holding more clearly defines a contour of DAPT interpretation and
handling. On one hand, this case adds needed precedent to a scarce area of
law. On the other hand, the holding may not show an enthusiastic
acceptance of DAPTs that the Klabacka holding had signaled.60 Perhaps
establishing comprehensive DAPT law will be like walking in sand: two
steps forward and one step back.
Additionally, few American jurisdictions have approved DAPTs.61
Only the minority of states allowing DAPTs means that clients may not be
receiving the best possible asset protection. Clients assume their attorney
is striving to provide the best strategy—and yet perhaps one of the best
56. See generally Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018).
57. Id. at 1203.
58. Id. at 1204 (citing Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914) (emphasis
added)).
59. Id. at 1201.
60. Professional sentiment about this case is that it may not truly add to the contours of DAPT
law. The transfers to the trusts occurred after the claims against the defendants had already arisen,
therefore the fraud exemption clearly renders the trust void. Furthermore, because the defendant was
subject to personal jurisdiction in a non-DAPT state, the assets are subject to administration by that
state. These are simple fraud-on-creditor and personal jurisdiction issues, not a DAPT efficacy issue.
See generally Jay Adkisson, Alaska Supreme Court Hammers Last Nail in DAPT Coffin for Use in
Non-DAPT States in Toni 1 Trust, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2018, 10:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/03/05/alaska-supreme-court-hammers-last-nail-indapt-coffin-for-use-in-non-dapt-states-in-toni-1-trust/#17c9157e62a7
[https://perma.cc/8LYQV8MZ].
61. See Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
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strategies is an elusive one because the courts and legislatures are
unwilling to budge on their stance. Most importantly, however, a lack of
favorable jurisdictions means that there is intensely concentrated interstate
competition among these jurisdictions.62 A lack of DAPT jurisdictions
means that seventeen states hold a monopoly on trust assets, simply
because they are willing to shield the trusts in a novel way.63
If courts and legislatures could resolve the enforceability questions
and promote DAPTs as a new trust option, the United States could see an
astonishing rise in trust formation and in turn, marketplace competition.
The benefits of these two solutions would affect the individual settlor and
the state.64
II. THE KLABACKA V. NELSON DECISION
A. Case Brief
The Klabacka opinion may be the first case to marshal in the benefits
of DAPTs because it not only established the novel concept of trust
efficacy, but it also addressed the public policy questions head-on.65 The
case involved a married couple, Eric and Lynita, each represented by
separate counsel, who signed separate property agreements that converted
all their assets from community property into separate property in 1993.66
In 2001, the couple placed their respective property into self-settled
spendthrift trusts, which were governed by Nevada law.67 The couple’s
divorce proceedings began in 2009.68 The district court “equalized the two
[self-settled spendthrift trusts] so as to pay Eric’s personal obligations and

62. See Daphne A. Kenyon, Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition, NEW ENGLAND ECON.
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 14.
63. Six of the ten most popular states for trusts include those with DAPT statutes. The Ten Most
Popular States for Trusts, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.wealth
management.com/estate-planning/ten-most-popular-states-trusts [https://perma.cc/JA94-D8KX].
64. See infra Part III.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Spendthrift Trusts:
Exceptions for Particular Types of Claims. The interest of a beneficiary in a valid spendthrift trust can
be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary for (a) support of a child,
spouse, or former spouse; or (b) services or supplies provided for necessities or for the protection of
the beneficiary’s interest in the trust.”); Greg Crawford, Klabacka vs. Nelson Sets Precedent for Asset
Protection in Nevada, ALLIANCE TR. CO. OF NEV. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://alliancetrust
company.com/news/nevadas-unparalleled-asset-protection/ [https://perma.cc/28YE-Z3BS]; Howard
M. Zaritsky, Court Sustains Domestic Asset Protection Trust Against Claims for Spousal and Child
Support, 29 PROB. PRAC. REP., No. 7, 2017, at 1, 4.
66. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 943 (Nev. 2017).
67. Id.
68. Crawford, supra note 65.
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also awarded Lynita a lump sum alimony award against Eric’s Trust—not
Eric in his personal capacity.”69
Each of the trusts had a spendthrift clause, prohibited attachment by
any future creditor, and listed Nevada residents as initial distribution
trustees.70 Further, each grantor held the right to veto any distribution; was
the investment trustee of his or her trust; held all rights as a trustee, other
than the power to make or direct distributions; and required that the
distribution trustee provide ten days’ notice of any impending
distribution.71 “The respective settlors, however, in the capacity of also
being an ‘investment trustee,’ retained the power to hold and manage the
investments of the respective trust.”72
The court held that the trusts were valid DAPTs because the terms of
the writing manifested an intention that the assets be protected from the
claims of the beneficiaries’ creditors, which is all that is required under
Nevada law.73 The law in question lists out an unambiguous test as to
whether a DAPT is valid, entailing that it must (1) be in writing, (2) be
irrevocable, (3) not require that any part of the trust’s income or principal
be distributed to the settlor, and (4) not be “intended to hinder, delay or
defraud known creditors.”74
The court relied heavily upon the legislative history of Nevada’s
DAPT statute.75 The court confirmed that Nevada does not have exception
creditors, including spouses and dependent children in a domestic dispute,
and expressly rejected the position given in section 59 of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts.76 The court reiterated:
The legislative history explicitly mentions child support as an
example of a debt that would not be free from attachment if known at
the time the trust was created. However, the trust assets would be
protected from attachment as to debts unknown at the time the trust
was created—presumably, this protection extended to child-and

69. Thomas Greene, Supreme Court Case Reinforces Nevada as #1 DAPT Jurisdiction, LIBERTY
ST. ADVISORY GRP. (May 11, 2017), https://www.libertystreetadvisorygroup.com/supreme-courtcase-reinforces-nevada-1-dapt-juridiction/ [https://perma.cc/VEN4-2HBR].
70. Zaritsky, supra note 65, at 4.
71. Id.
72. Edward D. Brown, Domestic Asset Protection Trust Not Obligated to Pay Spouse’s Alimony
and Child Support, DAVIS SCHILKEN L. BLOG (June 6, 2017), http://dslawcolorado.com/domesticasset-protection-trust-not-obligated-pay-spouses-alimony-child-support/
[https://perma.cc/7AVGTK2P].
73. Zaritsky, supra note 65, at 5.
74. Id.
75. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 951 (Nev. 2017).
76. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 22.
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spousal-support obligations unknown at the time the trust was
created.77

Understanding that the Nevada state law seeks to protect the assets
of a valid spendthrift trust against any court order, the court ensured the
efficacy of the DAPTs.78
The Klabacka holding is unique for three reasons. First, the case had
favorable facts that forced the court to decide the efficacy issue; there were
no choice of law questions and the fraudulent transfer question was easily
defeated.79 Second, after the Nevada court took the bait, it established an
unambiguous test for valid DAPTs, providing case law in favor of these
trusts—supplying attorneys with ammunition for their arguments in future
litigation. Finally, Nevada’s legislation is distinctive in its DAPT
friendliness.80 The Klabacka decision sprang from Nevada’s unique
friendliness towards DAPTs.
B. Legislative History Authority
A review of Nevada’s legislative history on DAPTs shows the blunt
considerations when passing the statute on spendthrift trusts. Three main
considerations were discussed when deciding how pro-DAPT the state
would be: the benefit to Nevada, the protection for the settlor, and the
likelihood of child support issues arising in the future.81 First, the
discussions explicitly state that the reasoning for such a settlor-friendly
law is to “increase estate tax revenue and attract assets to Nevada by
providing benefits to very wealthy persons.”82 Nevada Assemblyman
David Goldwater stated that when “the trust was domicile in Nevada and
the person was a resident of Nevada, Nevada got the benefit of all their
inheritance tax.”83 It is clear that Nevada stands to profit on multiple
revenue levels by allowing such trusts to be established within its

77. Klabacka, 394 P.3d at 951 (internal citation omitted).
78. Zaritsky, supra note 65, at 6.
79. Klabacka, 394 P.3d at 947.
80. Id. at 951.
81. See generally Hearing on Assemb. B. 469 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999
Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter Hearing 469], https://www.leg.state.nv.us/
Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1999/AB469,1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2CW-K3DG];
Hearing on Assemb. B. 378 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 6 (Nev. 2013)
[hereinafter Hearing 378], https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final
/1035.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VLS-RXHM].
82. Hearing 469, supra note 81, at 2.
83. Id. at 6.
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borders.84 In other words, “DAPT friendly laws are just one example
of . . . attraction-incentivized policy making.”85
Second, Mr. Goldwater stated that spendthrift trusts “offered
protection to wealthy people just as the committee was often fighting for
the rights of the poor . . . . Wealthy people deserved rights as well.”86 He
continued on by saying that the “problem of becoming extremely wealthy
was it becomes impossible to insure against that liability.”87 These frank
statements demonstrate the concerns that specific attorneys who need to
employ these asset protection tools have: preserving their clients’ wealth
in as many ways as possible.
Finally, a later committee fully examined the absence of creditor
rights for child support against these trusts.88 A committee member said
the group needed to “determine if we want to allow an individual to
support himself or herself with a large sum of money held in a spendthrift
trust and not pay child or spousal support, thereby requiring the taxpayers
to support the children or spouse through the welfare system.”89 This is by
far the strongest argument against such a settlor-friendly statute: the fear
of disadvantaging special creditors such as children. The public policy
rationale is that “a beneficiary of a trust should not be able to evade support
obligations by hiding behind a spendthrift clause. The needs of the
beneficiary’s ex-spouse and children are deemed to outweigh the rights of
the settlor to control the use of trust property.”90
In response, Senator Justin C. Jones said that his experience was that
“self-settled spendthrift trusts are sophisticated and require counsel to set
up. I am not sure the children or spouse of someone who has one of these
trusts would end up on welfare. An individual should be allowed to set up
an estate plan as he or she sees fit.”91 The Senator made an appealing
argument for individual choice and was further bolstered by another
committee member asserting that when “a trust is properly set up and does
not have a fraudulent conveyance, one-half to two-thirds of an individual’s
assets are outside of the trust. A trust is not set up so the individual is
84. Similar state-centric thinking can be found in Delaware’s corporate legal structure, which
shows the State’s desire to compete economically with the rest of the country. Some have questioned
whether stringent holdings against DAPTs indicate similar imminent fraud challenges to Delaware’s
differing corporate charter laws that so many businesses take advantage of. See Alexander B.
Shiffman, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust and Its Federalism Implications, 13 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 853, 877 (2015).
85. Id. at 875.
86. Hearing 469, supra note 81, at 6.
87. Id.
88. Hearing 378, supra note 81, at 3, 18.
89. Id. at 6.
90. BEYER, supra note 34, at 379.
91. Hearing 378, supra note 81, at 6.
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essentially indigent because all of his or her assets have been placed in
trust.”92 The rebuttal to the public policy opposition is therefore
extinguished under the reasoning that the creditors will still have access to
the majority of the settlor’s assets and should not be able to pierce the trust
veil unless fraud is proven.
Finally, the committee was informed that many states are no longer
observing special classes of creditors to pierce the trust veil:
The trend in the various states is to remove the exception creditors.
Utah removed these exception creditors and does not allow either to
access the trust. Wyoming does not allow a divorcing spouse to
access a trust. It has a special type of trustee that can be drafted into
the document to allow for not accessing child support out of the trust.
Virginia and Oklahoma only allow child support as an exception.
Colorado does not allow either exception. South Dakota recently
enacted legislation to not allow either exception unless it was already
a debt before the transfer to the trust. Enactment in this area has been
progressive, and other states are trying to match Nevada.93

It is clear that Nevada’s legislature deliberated on the benefits and
possible detriments establishing themselves as a DAPT friendly
jurisdiction. Ultimately, it instituted a unique statute heavily favoring the
trusts, concluding that the opportunity for fraud and misuse would be
minimal.94 The state’s legislature recognized the advantages that DAPTs
offered: those which this Note argues could be emulated in other
jurisdictions across the country.
III. THE MACRO ANALYSIS OF KLABACKA
There are generally two positive consequences to allowing DAPTs
and using the Klabacka holding as a template for states to mimic: public
policy and economic theory of interstate federalism. Each will be
discussed below, followed by an analysis of how these concepts resolve
the existing surety and scarcity issues facing DAPTs.
A. Public Policy
Time and again our country has demonstrated a progressive approach
to public policy; being flexible enough to change with the eras.95 Trust law
is no exception. Prior to 1997, not a single state explicitly allowed
92. Id. at 16.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Consider holdings in cases such as Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down all
state laws banning interracial marriage), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (legalizing
gay marriage).
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domestic asset protection trusts.96 Fast forward to now and seventeen
states allow these instruments, with additions as recent as March 2017.97
This Note contends that more states should, and will, recognize the various
public policy benefits by allowing DAPTs.
The first convincing policy argument for DAPTs is that the concept
is already widely accepted under a myriad of asset protection options that
provide almost duplicate benefits as DAPTs; for instance, there are
creditor-proof retirement accounts for employees.98 Scholars commonly
assert the rebuttal against these asset protection opportunities due to their
unwillingness to “allow debtors to leave their debts unpaid and still enjoy
an extravagant lifestyle.”99 But there are already enacted vehicles which
even scholars affirm are unsettling, such as tenancy by the entirety, family
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, homestead exemptions,
life insurance policies, annuity contracts, and transfers to close
individuals.100
A supreme benefit of DAPTs is they would offer security to business
owners from legal liability.101 Considering that in 2010 the average outside
litigation expense for a single company to litigate was $115 million,102
reduced liability is a significant incentive. Additionally, in the same year,
small businesses had to pay out eighty-one percent of the costs for
litigation, but only saw twenty-two percent of the settlement revenue.103
Domestic asset protection trusts could combat draining small businesses
of capital through frivolous tortious claims, currently causing them to pay
$35.6 billion of these costs out of their own coffers.104 Happily, the checks
on businesses abusing these asset protection vehicles are already in place,
such as fraudulent conveyance statutes.105 In theory, if small business
96. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1.
97. Id. Michigan enacted a DAPT statute in 2017, West Virginia in 2016, and Mississippi in
2014. Id.
98. See Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 689–90 (4th Cir. 1983).
99. See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1195, 1259 (2000).
100. Michael A. Passananti, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The Risks and Roadblocks Which
May Hinder Their Effectiveness, 32 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 260, 262 (2006).
101. Brendan Duffy, In States We “Trust”: Self-Settled Trusts, Public Policy, and Interstate
Federalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 232 (2016).
102. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2
(2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_survey_of_major_companies_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRQ7-T86G].
103. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORT LIABILITY COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS
9 (2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ilr_small_business_2010_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AM4A-XKPM].
104. Id. By shielding a portion of a business’s assets from tort liability the trust ensures a fortified
reserve is always available for the sustained operation of business.
105. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2005).
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owners are able to shield their assets from legal liability, they will be able
to drip these assets into the local economy, benefiting the community at
large.106
The next public policy argument in favor of DAPTs is the benefit the
United States would see economically. As stated previously, it is estimated
there are billions, if not trillions of dollars in wealth going to offshore
accounts.107 If this money was kept in the United States, the country’s
economy would benefit through attorney fees, financial advisors
employed, possible tax revenue, etc.108 Finally, there is the potential
extinction of costly litigation with foreign jurisdictions, saving money for
all parties involved.109 And of course, the courts could limit the fraudulent
activity if the accounts are within jurisdictional reach and better clarify the
edges of this nuanced area of law.
B. Competition Among States
Another benefit of normalizing DAPTs in the United States is the
recognition of the constitutional foundation of these accounts and the
economic advantage of interstate federalism. Setting the boundaries of a
court’s sovereignty, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
allows the application of one state’s law over another.110 This clause of the
Constitution states that full faith and credit “shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”111
Simply put, every state has its own laws, but no state’s laws are more
important or better than another’s.
When questioning DAPTs through the lens of interstate federalism,
it must be asked: what should states be doing according to the Constitution,
and also, is what they are doing benefitting the country? When looking at
the Constitution, it is clear that each state is a sovereign (Full Faith and
Credit Clause); that every citizen is treated equally, no matter the state they
are from or currently in (Privileges and Immunities Clause); and that the
states cannot erect trade obstructions (Commerce Clause).112 The
Constitution promotes a competitive, capitalistic model between states.113
And competition is one of the most basic motivations stimulating
behavior, and even helps to explain fundamental theories such as
106. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 103, at 6.
107. Taylor, supra note 47.
108. Duffy, supra note 101, at 233.
109. Id.
110. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308, 312–13 (1981).
111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
112. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
113. Christopher DeMuth, Competition and the Constitution, AM. ENTER. INST. (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.aei.org/publication/competition-and-the-constitution/ (last visited June 15, 2019).
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evolution.114 In an almost poetic way, DAPT legislation is an excellent
model of evolution, demonstrating that survival is based on the struggle
over limited resources.
Enacting statutes and obtaining certain holdings in the courts proves
Charles Tiebout’s research from the 1950s.115 Tiebout’s research was the
catalyst that produced two theories: (1) interstate competition compels
local representatives to grasp the true effects of their policies, and (2)
interstate competition results in a supreme distribution of goods, services,
and laws throughout the locality.116 An intriguing and analogous example
is the competitive results that occurred in state legislatures for legalizing
marijuana and gay marriage.117 This shows the economic benefits—no
matter if the idea is seen by some as controversial—of endorsing interstate
competition between states.118
The last question to ask is whether enacting DAPT statutes will even
benefit citizens. It is difficult to say precisely how much an individual and
state will profit from such action, but a similar circumstance has been used
to illustrate the changes in profits when a state changes its estate or
property laws.119 The increase in profits due to changes in these laws are
predictive of what trust law reformation could do because each of these
laws are highly intertwined and are typically used simultaneously to
achieve an overall legal plan for a client. The same clients that drove up
profits in the other fields of law would be those doing the same for trust
law.
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff looked at the economic
changes in several states after ending the rule against perpetuities.120 The
findings of the study showed there was a trust asset increase of as much as
twenty percent—more than six billion dollars.121 Another way to look at

114. Shiffman, supra note 84, at 874.
115. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956) (contending local competition would produce more effective public expenditures).
116. Duffy, supra note 101, at 235.
117. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 745, 831–33 (1995) (exploring the “first
mover” advantages states had to legalize same-sex marriage). See generally Brianne J. Gorod,
Marijuana Legalization and Horizontal Federalism, 50 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 595 (2016) (discussing
the legal friction and battles pitting states against other states—as opposed to a state against the federal
government—over legalized marijuana).
118. It is noted that with “the trust being an instrument that is freely transferrable from one
jurisdiction to another with little difficulty, the likelihood of the entanglement of opposing laws
becomes drastically greater.” Shiffman, supra note 84, at 876.
119. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for
Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L. J. 356 (2005).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 410.
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it: average individual accounts grew by at minimum $200,000.122 It is
unsurprising that professional groups, such as attorneys and accountants,
saw an increase in trust business—a demonstrated example of the benefits
that drip down throughout the state’s economy.123 In reflecting on their
findings, the professors mused that “jurisdictional competition in trust law
appears ready to focus next on [D]APTs.”124
DAPTs and federalism could have a symbiotic relationship—each
helping to stimulate the other. The federalist action of “racing to the top”
would improve DAPT law and efficacy, while the establishment of DAPTs
would promote strong competition among states, economically and
statutorily.125 The questions have been asked and answered: acceptance of
DAPTs would benefit the individual citizen, stimulate the distinct state’s
economy, and uphold the traditions embedded in the United States’
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
It seems fitting that this Note would open and close with economic
studies speaking to the topic at hand. The start of the discussion was the
anticipation of individuals seeking a protection option for newfound
wealth. The conclusion shows that the novel shelter approach of domestic
asset protection trusts can benefit the individual, the local community, the
state, and the country. First, however, internal struggles must be resolved
for DAPTs to truly shine. Advisors need to be sure of their advice,
knowing that they have the courts and law on their side when
recommending these asset protection vehicles. The Klabacka case
provides the ideal policy template for attorneys to, at minimum, bolster
their arguments in favor of a valid DAPT. Furthermore, legislatures now
have the Klabacka bright-line test to duplicate in their own legislation.
By debunking the timeworn ideas that public policy disfavors
DAPTs and adding confidence to promote them, it is the hope of this Note
that a path of clarification and surety should follow after Klabacka. As
noted, DAPTs are supported by the Constitution, federalism, and
economic studies. The time for domestic asset protection trusts as a
common planning tool is now. All that states and courts have to do is usher
in the Klabacka era.

122. Id. at 409.
123. Id. at 363.
124. Id. at 414.
125. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2012) (noting that “robust interjurisdictional competition facilities the
enactment of better public policy at the state level”).

